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overcome distrust paradoxically increases it, as repetitive checking 
has been observed to reduce memory accuracy (Radomsky and 
Alcolado, 2010), memory for details and confidence (van den Hout 
and Kindt, 2003).
Thus, it appears that memory is tainted by the process of check-
ing, but as Rachman (2002) proposed, any cognitive theory must 
account for the specific mechanisms underlying memory impair-
ment. The simplest interpretation suggests that basic capacity issues 
are responsible. However, a body of research indicated that this 
is not the case, with general capacity intact (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 
2007; Henseler et al., 2008) and impairment only observed as task 
difficulty increases (e.g., Purcell et al., 1998a,b; e.g., van der Wee 
et al., 2003, 2007) or if a task places a high emphasis upon efficient 
executive control (Savage et al., 1999, 2000; Harkin and Kessler, 
in press). This suggests that rather than being attributable to a gen-
eral mnestic deficit, memory impairment is secondary to executive 
dysfunction (Greisberg and McKay, 2003; van der Wee et al., 2003, 
2007; Penades et al., 2005; Olley et al., 2007; Omori et al., 2007; 
Bannon et al., 2008).
IntroductIon
In  this  study  we  extended  our  previous  research  on  working 
memory (WM) performance in subclinical checkers (Harkin and 
Kessler, 2009, 2011) by using stimuli that are more concordant 
with clinical symptomatology (Moritz and von Muehlenen, 2008). 
The rationale being that while we previously reported robust and 
replicable effects using letters in locations, a central criticism was 
that these stimuli do not directly relate to checking compulsions 
in  clinical  obsessive–compulsive  disorder  (OCD).  This  paper 
therefore provides a necessary methodological step forward by 
employing electrical kitchen appliances that are more relevant to 
checkers primary concerns (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson et al., 
2004). Checking compulsions are most commonly observed in 
OCD with 50–80% of patients reporting this subtype (Henderson 
and Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen and Eisen, 1988; Antony et al., 1998). 
The motivation of pathological checking appears to reflect their 
distrust in a previous action and/or thought and so they check 
and recheck to compensate for their own perceived shortcom-
ings (Rachman and Shafran, 1998). However, their attempts to 
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doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00078encoding set. We found that only high checkers’ performance on 
the actual WM test (probe 2) was impaired in the context of a mis-
leading probe (probe 1). Considering that an intermediate probe 
is irrelevant to the performance of the memory test, we conclude 
that checkers are more distracted by a misleading probe as it is not 
part of the encoded set. Checkers either cannot suppress the dis-
tractor itself, or cannot suppress the urge to check triggered by the 
misleading distractor. A process which we suggest is perhaps driven 
by impairment in inhibitory functioning specific to the checking 
but not the washing subtype (Omori et al., 2007). However, in our 
second series of experiments we observed that checkers’ suffered 
similar memory impairments for resolvable and misleading spatial 
probes (see Experiment 2; Harkin and Kessler, 2011). Thus, while 
there is a delicate balance between resolvability and general dis-
traction, in either case it appears that checkers’ poorer memory is 
due to an executive deficit of inhibitory functioning which impairs 
attention-dependent bindings within the episodic buffer.
This  explanation  is  supported  by Omori  et al.  (2007)  who 
reported in a clinical OCD patient group, that only for clinical 
checkers (not washers) were deficits in inhibition associated with 
poor episodic memory. Not only does this highlight the central role 
of inhibition in checking and OCD generally (see Chamberlain 
et al., 2005) but also suggests that this dysfunctional aspect of 
executive control may exist on a continuum between subclinical 
to clinical checking. For example, subclinical checkers have shown 
similar deficits to those observed in clinical OCD, i.e., the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (Gershuny and Sher, 1995) and the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (Sher et al., 1984). Further, this same group have 
shown memory deficits for everyday activities (Sher et al., 1984), 
prospective memory impairments (Cuttler and Graf, 2007, 2008, 
2009), and were poorer at distinguishing real from imagined events 
(Rubenstein et al., 1993). This has lead some researchers to suggest 
that a subclinical analog is a valid means of understanding a vari-
ety of features relevant to clinical OCD, especially as they are free 
from confounds such as medication, clinical state, or co-morbidity 
(Mataix-Cols et al., 1997, 1999). Indeed, considering this alongside 
the commonality of checking in OCD (50–80%; Henderson and 
Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen and Eisen, 1988; Antony et al., 1998) 
and the population generally (15%; Stein et al., 1997), subclinical 
checkers may provide a “purer” means for determining the specific 
impact of executive deficits upon WM functioning.
The notion that executive dysfunction and memory impairment 
is specific – i.e., only occurs when a memory task calls upon a dys-
functional component of the executive – is further supported in 
the literature. For example, van der Wee et al. (2003) used a spatial 
variant of the n-back WM task with four levels of load. It was only 
at the highest load level (3-back) that patients with OCD signifi-
cantly differed from controls with errors of 48 vs. 25%, respectively. 
They argued that OCD patients may over-scrutinize their perform-
ance or have a deficit in supervisory (i.e., executive) processes, as 
opposed to deficits in maintenance or manipulation, which sug-
gests that general capacity limitations are not responsible for the 
results. The stability of executive-memory impairment at higher 
levels of task complexity have been observed across a range of WM 
tasks, for example, the spatial WM task (Purcell et al., 1998a,b), 
paired association learning (Morein-Zamir et al., 2010), and the 
corsi block tapping task (Zielinski et al., 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001; 
In explanation, Harkin and Kessler (2009) originally proposed 
Baddeley’s (2000) model of WM as a unifying framework to account 
for the domain and/or episode specific nature of memory impair-
ment in OCD (e.g., “Did I turn the iron off?”). Baddeley’s (1986) 
original model included the central executive for higher order 
control and two slave systems for the temporary maintenance of 
visuospatial (i.e., visuospatial sketchpad) and phonemic (i.e., pho-
nological loop) information. While this model explained a range 
of experimental data it failed to account for the manner in which 
the cognitive system bound information from multimodal sources 
and accurately maintained them over a delay (see Baddeley, 2000 
for review). As a solution Baddeley (2000) introduced the episodic 
buffer which explained the binding of multimodal information into 
temporarily integrated representations. By multimodal we refer to 
aspects of a complex visual scene that are processed in different cor-
tical streams, specifically: the ventral and dorsal processing streams 
for object and location representations, respectively. Therefore, 
if accurate task performance is dependent upon accurate object 
(“What”) and location (“Where”) information then this will rely 
upon the maintenance of accurate object–location conjunctions in 
what Baddeley had termed the “episodic buffer” (see Olson et al., 
2006; Keizer et al., 2008). For example, Prabhakaran et al. (2000) 
reported that separately maintaining verbal (letters) and location 
information activated more posterior and disparate brain regions 
(letters: left inferior/Broca and left inferior parietal and temporal vs. 
locations: right frontal and bilateral superior parietal) compared to 
when letter–location information was bound (e.g., right prefron-
tal cortex). Also in a study of patients with medial temporal lobe 
amnesia, memory was impaired for accurate conjunction WM but 
was normal for independent objects and locations (Olson et al., 
2006). Therefore, while the neuropsychological basis of binding 
is debatable, it is evident that objects and locations are processed 
independently (likely ventral vs. dorsal, respectively) but when 
required in a multimodal format (letter–location conjunctions) 
rely on a mediating system, akin to the episodic buffer.
Indeed, while there has been some dispute regarding the exact 
mechanism underlying multimodal binding in the episodic buffer, 
researchers tend to agree that attentional effort is required for 
its generation and maintenance (Wheeler and Treisman, 2002; 
Delvenne and Bruyer, 2006; Fougnie and Marois, 2009; Hyun et al., 
2009). Therefore, memory impairment occurs if distraction is suf-
ficient to interfere with attention-dependent bindings. Considering 
the established sensitivity of bindings to interference (see Wheeler 
and Treisman, 2002; Kessler and Kiefer, 2005; Delvenne and Bruyer, 
2006; Fougnie and Marois, 2009; Hyun et al., 2009) we proposed 
that if a task taps into the executive deficits of OCD/checkers, then 
this will interfere with attention allocated to bindings, thus, impair-
ing memory as a consequence (for a review, see Harkin and Kessler, 
in press). Accordingly, in our previous experiments (Harkin and 
Kessler, 2009) we had set out to: (1) engage the episodic buffer 
by using a memory task where accuracy was dependent upon the 
veridical maintenance of letters to locations, and then (2) hamper 
episodic buffer functionality by presenting information that was 
relevant to the executive impairments of high but not low check-
ers during the WM retention interval. Specifically, for the latter 
we probed an item that had not been presented during encoding: 
“Where was letter ‘K’?” – while there had been no letter “K” in the 
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memory impairments are not attributable to capacity per se (i.e., 
intact at lower load levels; see also Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler 
et al., 2008) but rather represent a failure of executive functioning 
to match increasing task demands in terms of strategic resource 
organization. To reiterate, these findings indicate that successful 
WM performance is dependent upon sustained and correctly allo-
cated attention (i.e., executive control), which locates poor memory 
in our studies and in others’ research within the domain of executive 
dysfunction as opposed to impairments of basic WM capacity. We 
are careful here to note that executive functioning is intertwined 
with basic WM storage at all levels of task requirements and/or 
difficulty. However, in terms of the locus of impairment we agree 
with view that memory impairment observed here and in oth-
ers’ research is secondary to executive dysfunction (Greisberg and 
McKay, 2003).
Thus, considering these points alongside the methodological 
limitations of our previous research (using letters) we presented 
four electrical kitchen appliances located in six possible locations, 
of which two were “ON” (electrical light was bright red) and two 
were “OFF” (electrical light was dark red). The primary memory 
task (probe-2) required the participants to recall if an appliance 
had been “ON” or “OFF” (Experiment 1) or if an appliance was 
correctly located (Experiment 2) as shown in Figure 1. In both 
experiments, we used an intermediate spatial-location probe simi-
lar to Experiment 2 of Harkin and Kessler (2011), where it had 
produced stable group effects (i.e., low standard deviations) and 
substantial memory impairments in high compared to low check-
ers. This intermediate probe was presented at a location where 
an appliance had either been present (resolvable) or at a location 
that had been completely empty (misleading), participants had to 
indicate if the appliance at that location had been “ON” or “OFF”. 
An additional yet critical development of our methodology related 
to trial-type ratio. In our previous experiments we presented two 
blocks, one with predominantly misleading trials (66%) and a 
counterbalanced block of resolvable trials as a result we could 
not exclude the influence that this had upon checkers’ WM per-
formance. Therefore, we currently used an equal trial-ratio (33% 
resolvable, 33% misleading, 33% no-probe-1) which allowed us to 
develop a clearer understanding of the specific effect(s) of trial-type 
and/or group on memory performance (probe-2). We predict that 
using such stimuli and probing the spatial location of threatening 
Figure 1 | Procedure and stimuli in experiments 1 and 2. The experiments differed only on probe-2. Please note that appliances were only ever presented in the 
top 2 (vertical) × 3 (horizontal) countertop locations.
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hand). This probe previously produced stable group effects (i.e., low 
standard deviations) and substantial memory impairments in high 
compared to low checkers. Additionally, using such an intermedi-
ate probe was motivated by our recent findings that an explicit, yet 
task irrelevant “ON” cue interfered with normal inhibitory function-
ing (i.e., inhibition of return (IOR); Posner and Cohen, 1984) of a 
high scoring subclinical OCD/checking group but not a low scoring 
group (Experiment 2). Thus, for high checkers drawing attention to 
the functional and threatening aspects of electrical appliances and 
probing empty locations may resonate with the established executive 
impairments of high checkers in inhibiting irrelevant thoughts and/
or stimuli (Savage et al., 2000; Olley et al., 2007; Omori et al., 2007). 
Baseline trials were also included; these presented an empty kitchen 
countertop (i.e., no-probe-1) designed to measure WM under ideal 
conditions. A mask was again presented (1000 ms) before the actual 
memory task. In Experiment 1, probe-2 simply presented a single 
electrical appliance at the center of the screen, the participant had to 
indicate if they recalled it as being “ON” (right index finger) or “OFF” 
(right middle index finger) with respect to the original encoded set. 
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their confidence in their 
probe-2 decision as indicated simply by a “Confident” (right index 
finger) or “Not Confident” (right middle index finger) response.
There were 156 trials in total, 12 of which (at the beginning) 
were practice including resolvable and no-probe-1 trials only. The 
main experiment was then done in two blocks (with 5 min rest 
period between), each comprising 24 resolvable, 24 misleading, and 
24 no-probe-1 trials presented in random order. Importantly, we 
employed an equal ratio of trial type in the current experiments: 
33% resolvable, 33% misleading, 33% no-probe-1, while in our 
previous studies we had employed at least one block with 66% 
misleading trials (and a counterbalanced block of predominantly 
resolvable probe-1 trials, cf. Harkin and Kessler, 2009, 2011). We 
did this to remove the influence of trial-type ratio which had to be 
counterbalanced across two blocks in our previous experimental 
designs. This allowed us to develop a clearer understanding of the 
specific effect(s) of trial-type and/or group on memory perform-
ance (probe-2). For example, in our original experiment (Harkin 
and Kessler, 2009) it is possible that high checkers’ poor perform-
ance on misleading trials was driven by the novelty/surprise caused 
by an unfamiliar trial type.
Design
A two (Group: low vs. high checkers) by three (Probe-1: resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 State: ON, OFF) mixed 
design was employed with group as the between- and probe-1 and 
probe-2 state as the within-subjects factors.
results and dIscussIon
MANOVAs for a 2 × 3 × 2 design were carried out for reaction times, 
accuracy and confidence on probe-2 responses due to violations of 
the sphericity assumption (Mauchley’s tests).
Probe-2 Response Latencies
The MANOVA (2 × 3 × 2) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main 
effect of group, high checkers (1898.4 ms) were significantly slower in 
responding than the low group [1573.4 ms; F(1,38) = 10.65, p = 0.047, 
aspects of them may potentially enhance executive dysfunction, 
impair attention-dependent bindings (i.e., Experiment 1: state to 
appliance or Experiment 2: appliance to location) and perhaps 
produce novel memory and metacognitive impairments compared 
to our previous work.
experIment 1
methods
Stimuli in Experiment 1 (and 2)
With the predominance of checking in OCD we employed ecologically 
valid stimuli that were concordant with this symptomatology. For 
example, the Vancouver Obsessional–Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; 
Thordarson et al., 2004), and the checking subscale specifically, ask 
respondents to indicate if they repeatedly check and recheck things 
like “switches, faucets, appliances, and doors” and “that the stove is 
turned off” (Thordarson et al., 2004). Additionally, Rachman (2002) 
highlighted the specific nature of perseveration: “Yes, I remember that 
I did check the stove but I cannot remember if I checked it satisfacto-
rily. Was the switch fully turned off? I cannot remember if it is safe” 
(p. 631). Accordingly, we used images of electric kitchen appliances 
(fryer, iron, kettle, toaster, coffee machine, hob, microwave, sandwich 
maker) as encoding set stimuli and then asked two specific memory 
questions with respect to these stimuli in Experiment 1 (Appliance 
“ON/OFF” State) and Experiment 2 (Appliance Location).
Participants
A total of 40 participants (mean 20.8 years: 12 males, 28 females) 
from the University of Glasgow gave written informed consents. 
British Psychological Society ethical requirements were met, includ-
ing that of participant debriefing. The VOCI (Thordarson et al., 
2004) was employed to evaluate all participants regarding their 
checking tendencies. The VOCI is a 55-item, self-report question-
naire for assessing the severity of OCD symptoms. The checking 
subscale was used in the present study. A median split of checking 
scores was used to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 0.5, SD: 0.61) 
and high (mean: 13.85, SD: 4.12) “checkers.” Further, no statisti-
cal differences between the low and high groups were revealed in 
gender distribution (p = 0.72) or age (p = 0.27).
Procedure
Participants sat 60 cm from a computer screen with their head on a 
chin rest. At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was presented 
for 2000 ms. A kitchen countertop was then presented for 6000 ms 
with four electrical kitchen appliances presented randomly in six 
possible locations as shown in Figure 1. Two of these appliances were 
“ON” as indicated by a red light and two were shown to be “OFF” with 
no accompanying light. After this a mask was presented for 1000 ms, 
this was to reduce the influence that possible image retention may 
have played in subsequent retrieval (i.e., distinct appliances and/
or their “ON” states), thus isolating disturbances in later memory-
probe performance to those of WM. After this a probe-1 question 
asked if a device at a specific location was either “ON” or “OFF.” As 
in our previous research (Experiment 2; Harkin and Kessler, 2011) 
this probe was presented (3000 ms) at a location where there had 
been (resolvable) or had not been (misleading) a device in the origi-
nal encoding set. Participants were asked to indicate if the device 
at this location (resolvable or misleading) was either “ON” (left 
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ing subscale was used to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 0.0, SD: 
0.0) and high (mean: 13.75, SD: 6.16) “checkers.” Further, no sta-
tistical differences between the low and high groups were revealed 
in gender distribution (p = 0.31) or age (p = 0.58).
Procedure
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with two exceptions. 
(1) Probe-2: We presented an electrical appliance either at the 
correct (50%) or incorrect (50%) location with respect to the 
encoding set and asked participants to indicate if it was correctly 
or incorrectly located (see Figure 1). (2) Confidence: We asked 
participants to indicate their confidence on a sliding scale from 0 
(no confidence at all) to 100 (complete confidence). We expected 
this scale to be more sensitive in detecting between-group differ-
ences in meta-cognition than the binary response option employed 
in Experiment 1.
There were 156 practice trials in total, 12 of which were practice 
trials including resolvable and no-probe-1 trials only. The main 
experiment was then done in two blocks (with 5 min rest period 
between), each comprising of 24 resolvable, 24 misleading, and 24 
no-probe-1 trials presented in random order. As in Experiment 1 an 
equal ratio of misleading, resolvable and no-probe-1 trials were used.
Design
A two (Group: low vs. high checkers) by three (Probe-1: resolv-
able, misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 Location: Correct, 
Incorrect) mixed design was employed with group as the between- 
and probe-1 and probe-2 location as the within-subjects factors.
results and dIscussIon
MANOVAs for a 2 × 3 × 2 design were carried out for reaction times, 
accuracy, and confidence on probe-2 responses due to violations 
of the sphericity assumption (Mauchley’s tests).
Probe-2 Response Latencies
A main effect of trial type [F(2,76) = 4.01, p = 0.022, ηp
2 0 095 = .
] reflected the linear increase in RTs across resolvable (1847.4 ms), 
misleading (1943.9 ms), and no-probe-1 trials (2019.9 ms). We sug-
gest that the presence of an intermediate probe (resolvable or mis-
leading) may focus the attention of checkers to responding which 
primes them to subsequent responding, leading to faster responding 
in these conditions compared to when no intermediate probe (i.e., no 
response priming) is presented. This pattern was previously observed 
in our original experiments, which when considered in relation to 
the different probe-1 RTs of Experiment 1 (Misleading > Resolvable 
= No-Probe-1) indicates that the relationship between probe-1 and 
the specificity of probe-2 is sufficient to influence RTs. A main effect 
of probe-2 location [F(1,38) = 39.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2 0 508 = . ] showed 
that participants responded slower to an appliance that was correctly 
located (2067.8 ms) with respect to the encoded set compared to one 
that was incorrectly located (1806.4 ms).
Probe-2 Accuracy
The  main  effect  of  probe-2  location  reached  significance 
[F(1,38) = 42.86, p < 0.001,  ηp
2 0 530 = . ], which reflected poorer 
accuracy for correctly (79.4%) compared to incorrectly located 
ηp
2 0 099 = . ]. A main effect for trial type [F(2,76) = 5.59, p = 0.005, 
ηp
2 0 128 = . ], reflected slower RTs overall for misleading trials com-
pared to resolvable [F(1,38) = 9.32, p = 0.004] and no-probe-1 trials 
[F(1,38) = 9.20, p = 0.004]. This suggests that for all participants mak-
ing a probe-2 location decision is particularly sensitive to a misleading 
intermediate probe: encouraging participants to examine the state 
of an appliance at a location where there is none slows subsequent 
location based responding. A significant main effect for probe-2 state 
[F(1,38) = 24.7, p < 0.001, ηp
2 0 393 = . ] revealed that all participants 
were slower in responding to an appliance that was “OFF” (1847.6 ms) 
compared to “ON” (1624.2 ms) in the encoded set.
Probe-2 Accuracy
The MANOVA (2 × 3 × 2) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main 
effect of group [F(1,38) = 4.27, p = 0.046, ηp
2 0 101 = . ], with high 
checkers (87.3%) significantly less accurate than the low group 
(94.1%). Importantly, as high checkers were significantly slower in 
making their responses, we can rule out a speed-accuracy trade-off 
as an explanation for their poorer accuracy. A main effect for trial 
type [F(2,76) = 4.08, p = 0.046, ηp
2 0 100 = . ], reflected no-probe-1 
trials were more accurate than resolvable [F(1,38) = 5.93, p = 0.02, 
ηp
2 0 097 = . ] or misleading trials [F(1,38) = 6.70, p < 0.05]. Therefore, 
for all participants an intermediate probe resulted in poorer probe-2 
state accuracy compared to trials with no intermediate probe.
Confidence Responses
The MANOVA (2 × 3 × 2) for confidence responses concentrated 
upon the total “not-confident” responses of each participant in each 
condition. A main effect for trial type [F(2,76) = 7.99, p = 0.002, 
ηp
2 0 153 = . ] reflected lower confidence for all participants for mis-
leading trials compared to resolvable [F(1,38) = 4.60, p = 0.038] 
and no-probe-1 trials [F(1,38) = 10.27, p = 0.002]. Also a main 
effect of probe-2 state [F(1,38) = 26.68, p < 0.001,  ηp
2 0 412 = . ] 
indicated that all participants had less confidence for an electrical 
appliance that had been “OFF” than “ON.” No effects involving 
group reached significance.
To sum up, we found a general accuracy deficit for high checkers 
that could reflect general capacity issues. However, based on our 
previous research (Harkin and Kessler, 2009, 2011) and research 
reported by others (Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008), we did 
not believe this to be the case. In contrast, we hypothesized that the 
employed probe-2 may have focused checkers’ attention too strongly 
on the threatening aspect of the stimuli (electric on/off status), hence 
introducing a generally higher level of interference during encoding, 
maintenance, and/or retrieval fuelled by anxiety. Hence, we devised 
a second experiment that differed from Experiment 1 regarding the 
feature dimension of the memory test (probe-2). Instead of probing 
the state of an appliance (on vs. off) we probed its location (cor-
rect vs. incorrect). We expected a more differentiated pattern across 
conditions with a special role for misleading trials.
experIment 2
methods
Participants
A total of 40 participants (mean: 21.85 years, 13 males and 27 
females) from the University of Glasgow gave written informed 
consents. British Psychological Society ethical requirements were 
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sufficient to reduce confidence in all participants. Probe-2 loca-
tion reached significance [F(1,38) = 20.51, p < 0.001, ηp
2 0 351 = . ] 
and reflected less confidence for correctly compared to incorrectly 
located appliances. Poorer confidence for a correctly located appli-
ance reflected the poorer accuracy that all participants had in this 
condition. The group × probe-2 location interaction approached 
significance [F(1,38) = 3.65, p = 0.064, ηp
2 0 087 = . ], with group 
differences observed for incorrectly [F(1,38) = 8.31, p = 0.006] but 
not correctly located appliances [F(1,38) = 2.23, p = 0.144]. Thus, 
the low checkers mirrored the general trend of the probe-2 loca-
tion main effect (i.e., poorer performance for correct than incor-
rect), whereas the high group had poorer confidence across both 
conditions.
Correlations between accuracy and confidence were conducted 
for each group and both groups showed significant relationships 
(low group: r = 0.56, n = 20, p = 0.01; high group: r = 0.71, n = 20, 
p = 0.000) indicating that for all participants confidence mirrors 
accuracy. In a further analysis we subtracted confidence scores 
from accuracy scores for each participant in each condition, which 
produced what we termed a discrepancy score. A discrepancy score 
of 0 indicates that accuracy and confidence mirror each other, 
whereas an increasing discrepancy score indicates that confidence 
is numerically less than preceding accuracy. We were primarily 
interested in group differences in discrepancy scores across trial-
types, as this could indicate conditions, where confidence and 
accuracy might only diverge in high checkers, revealing a meta-
cognitive deficit.
In  a  MANOVA  analysis  of  the  discrepancy  scores  the 
interaction between group × trial-type reached significance 
[F(1,38) = 3.14, p = 0.049,  ηp
2 0 076 = . ]. Analysis of the sim-
ple main effects for group at each level of trial-type revealed 
a significant group difference (LC = 6.42 vs. HC = 14.18) 
for    no-probe-1  trials  [F(1,38)  =  5.42,  p  =  0.025]  but  not 
appliances  (94.5%). When  considered  alongside  the  RT  main 
effect  for  probe-2  this  suggests  that  correctly  located  appli-
ances are more difficult to resolve which is reflected in slower 
RTs. In explanation, an incorrect location can be disproved by 
at least two partial representations such as remembering which 
object actually had been in the probe location or by remember-
ing the correct location of the probe object. This is not the case 
for correct probes where this particular object–location binding 
has to be received veridically. Group × trial type was significant 
[F(1,38) = 3.42, p = 0.038, ηp
2 0 082 = . ]. Analysis of the simple main 
effects for group at each level of trial-type revealed a significant 
group difference (low = 90.5% vs. high = 82.3%) for mislead-
ing trials [F(1,38) = 7.52, p = 0.009; see Figure 2], whereas, for 
resolvable and no-probe-1 trials no statistically significant group 
difference was observed (p = 0.084 and 0.366, respectively). We 
further analyzed the simple main effects within each group to 
determine the locus of between-condition performance differ-
ences. For the low group, no differences were reported between 
resolvable, misleading, or no-probe-1 trials (i.e., all p > 0.3). On 
the other hand, for high checkers, responses were less accurate for 
misleading trials than no-probe-1 trials [F(1,38) = 5.99, p = 0.019], 
but responses for resolvable and no-probe-1 trials were similarly 
accurate (p = 0.361). Overall this suggest that the significant inter-
action between group × trial is due to the special role of misleading 
trials within the high checkers as well as with respect to group 
differences.
Confidence Ratings
A main effect of group revealed [F(1,38) = 5.30, p = 0.027, ηp
2 0 122 = .
] that high checkers (70.67) had poorer confidence overall com-
pared  to  low  checkers  (80.71).  Trial-type  reached    significance 
[F(2,76)  =  5.87,  p  =  0.004,  ηp
2 0 134 = . ],  which  was  driven  by 
poorer confidence on misleading trials compared to resolvable 
[F(1,38) = 4.67, p = 0.037] and no-probe-1 trials [F(1,38) = 8.15, 
Figure 2 | Probe-2 accuracy (ACC%) for group (low vs. high) at each level of trial type (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1). *Denotes significance at p < 0.01 level.
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functioning, high checkers’ poorer accuracy overall (compared to 
low scoring checkers) could be interpreted as impaired WM capac-
ity. However, we argue against this for a number of reasons (for a 
review see Harkin and Kessler, in press). Firstly, if checkers have a 
general WM capacity impairment then this would have influenced 
our previous results (Harkin and Kessler, 2009, 2011). A general 
impairment would negatively affect WM performance irrespective 
of the content of the encoded set, i.e., similar no-probe-1 impair-
ment for letters and electrical appliances. Secondly, if checkers suf-
fered from basic capacity impairment, then memory would not be 
influenced by the specificity of the probe-2 question, whereby they 
would necessarily have impaired appliance-location (Experiment 2) 
memory in the no-probe-1 condition. Thirdly, there is a convergence 
of evidence showing that basic WM capacity is intact (Ciesielski 
et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) with impairment only observed 
at high load levels when tasks stress dysfunctional components of 
executive control in OCD patients (Zielinski et al., 1991; Purcell 
et al., 1998a,b; Zitterl et al., 2001; Moritz et al., 2003; van der Wee 
et al., 2003; Boldrini et al., 2005; Morein-Zamir et al., 2010). Finally, 
considering that in simple memory tasks subclinical checkers have 
outperformed OCD patients (Tuna et al., 2005) and controls (Irak 
and Flament, 2009), it is unlikely that our group of subclinical 
checkers had anomalous capacity issues. Rather, it is likely that 
they have executive impairments analogous to those observed in 
clinical OCD (Mataix-Cols et al., 1997, 1999; Omori et al., 2007), 
which interferes with efficient state–appliance–location bindings 
during encoding and/or maintenance. This is in agreement with 
the perspective that memory impairments in OCD are secondary 
to executive dysfunction (Greisberg and McKay, 2003) and it is 
further in agreement with the metacognitive deficit revealed in 
Experiment 2.
The differences between low and high checkers were some-
what more subtle, yet even more revealing in Experiment 2: (1) 
Performance of high checkers was significantly affected on mis-
leading trials compared to baseline (no-probe 1 trials). (2) The 
misleading  condition  revealed  the  strongest  group  difference 
with the best performance for low- and the worst performance 
for high checkers across all trial conditions. (3) In contrast to 
Experiment 1, high checkers’ performance on no-probe-1 trials 
did not significantly differ from the performance of low checkers. 
Finally, there was a statistical trend for a group difference on the 
resolvable trials that was reminiscent of the significant differ-
ences we had observed before with a spatial probe and abstract 
stimuli (letters in locations, Experiment 2 in Harkin and Kessler, 
2011). There, a spatial probe had been generally distracting for 
high checkers. Here however, when the stimuli were relevant to 
checkers’ symptoms (electric appliances with switches) a mis-
leading probe provides additional impairment to that caused by 
an intermediate spatial probe resulting in the main, statistically 
reliable difference. This is corroborated by the significant interac-
tion between group and trial type and further detailed analysis 
which revealed that high checkers performed significantly worse 
on misleading compared to baseline trials while performance on 
resolvable compared to baseline trials did not significantly differ. 
In contrast, the performance of low checkers did not significantly 
differ for any trial-type comparison.
for resolvable [F(1,38) = 0.60, p = 0.442] or misleading tri-
als [F(1,38) = 0.76, p = 0.389]. This indicates that low and 
high  checkers  confidence-accuracy  discrepancy  is  similarly 
inflated in trials when there is an intermediate probe: accu-
racy is greater than confidence. However, in no-probe-1 trials 
low checkers accuracy–confidence is more concordant (6.42) 
compared to high checkers whose discrepancy score (14.18) is 
similar to that observed in resolvable (12.47) and misleading 
trials (14.04). We interpret that high checkers suffer a task 
independent impairment in their metacognitive functioning 
which is expressed here as less confidence in their accuracy 
on no-probe-1 trials.
dIscussIon
The present experiments used electrical kitchen appliances that 
were concordant with the symptomatology of those afflicted with 
obsessive–compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson 
et al., 2004). We did this in an attempt to address a primary 
criticism of our previous research (Harkin and Kessler, 2009, 
2011) that letters in locations do not resonate with the primary 
concerns of checkers. We predicted that for high checkers using 
episodically rich stimuli and questioning a threatening aspect of 
them (i.e., “ON/OFF” state of probe-1) would provide a greater 
challenge to the attention-dependent bindings required for accu-
rate memory recall. In a separate study on IOR with the same 
kitchen appliances as employed here, we indeed confirmed that 
drawing attention directly to the functionality of these electric 
appliances turned IOR into positive priming in high- but not in 
low scoring OCD/checkers in a subclinical sample. In short, this 
means that high scorers’ attention perseveres on a threatening 
stimulus once it was drawn to it, underpinning the ecological 
validity of our stimuli.
We observed that group effects differed between experiments, 
a finding we attribute to employing ecologically valid stimuli 
and probing different features of the memory in Experiment 
1 (electric state on/off) compared to Experiment 2 (location). 
Experiment 1 supported our claim that our stimuli were compat-
ible with OCD/checking symptomatology by revealing a main 
group  effect  in  reaction  times  and  accuracy.  However,  reac-
tion times and accuracy data also indicated that the particular 
manipulations in Experiment 1 may have resulted in a degree 
of interference in all participants. Specifically, probe-2 reaction 
times were slower after a misleading intermediate probe, sug-
gesting that this experiment encouraged all participants to access 
the “ON/OFF” states of the appliances which then slowed sub-
sequent responding to a state-based probe-2 question. Memory 
decisions regarding appliances’ “ON” or “OFF” states (probe-
2) were significantly slower for all participants in misleading 
compared to resolvable or no-probe-1 trials. Memory accuracy 
was significantly poorer after resolvable and misleading trials 
compared to no-probe-1 trials. So for all participants continu-
ally focusing on ON/OFF states appears to have come at the cost 
to their performance. Together, the strengths of these general 
effects could have been sufficient to obscure group effects but 
this proved not to be the case: High checkers were generally 
slower and poorer at recalling the state of an electric appliance 
compared to low checkers.
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The current findings confirm that checkers’ memory impairments 
are secondary to executive dysfunction, especially when ecologi-
cally valid stimuli are employed. The different accuracy patterns 
of high compared to low checkers between Experiments 1 and 
2 allow us to make the following conclusions. In Experiment 1, 
we observed a novel finding with high checkers showing a robust 
impairment in their ability to accurately recall the state (“ON” 
or “OFF”) of an electrical appliance. A group effect which was 
surprisingly not influenced by trial type (resolvable, misleading, 
no-probe). While superficially this appears to indicate a general 
impairment in WM capacity, we have highlighted a number of 
reasons why this is an unsatisfactory explanation. We conclude 
that  this  novel,  general  impairment  is  rather  specific  to  the 
memory task (probe-2) in Experiment 1 that biased subclini-
cal checkers toward the threatening electric on/off status of the 
appliances, which in turn generally interfered with multimo-
dal bindings in the episodic buffer. In contrast, Experiment 2 
revealed the expected, more differentiated pattern with a special 
status for misleading trials: Performance of high checkers was 
significantly affected on misleading trials compared to baseline 
trials and the strongest group difference was observed in the 
  misleading condition.
In Experiment 2 we successfully employed a continuous confi-
dence scale that allowed us to calculate discrepancy scores between 
accuracy and confidence for each participant in each condition. 
The main result was that while there overall strong correlations 
between accuracy and confidence in both groups, only the high 
checkers revealed a significant discrepancy in the baseline condi-
tion. Although they reached their highest performance levels in this 
condition, their confidence did not improve, which we interpret as 
supporting a metacognitive deficit that is absent in low checkers. 
The importance of memory and metacognitive impairments in 
OCD is corroborated by reports that poor memory and checking 
influences the severity of obsessional thinking (Purcell et al., 1998a; 
Park et al., 2006).
lImItatIons
The following limitations of our study have to be considered. 
Firstly, using a subclinical group always raises the issue of their 
relevance as an analog to a clinical group. We agree, however, 
with Mataix-Cols et al. (1997, 1999) that subclinical OCD groups 
are a valid means of determining which cognitive factors play 
a role in clinically defined OCD, particularly considering their 
reduced medication and potential for co-morbidities. We there-
fore expect that the pattern observed here with subclinical check-
ers could be more pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, 
also more variable. Secondly, despite the claim that a subclinical 
group provides a “purer” indication of the cognitive impair-
ments specific to this subtype; we did not control for anxiety 
or depression nor did we provide an independent cognitive 
index of WM functioning and so cannot exclude possible group 
differences. Thirdly, subjects were not explicitly matched for 
education; however, they were selected from an undergraduate 
population, thus, ensuring a homogenous educational back-
ground for all participants, which is yet another advantage of 
a subclinical sample. Fourthly, we did not counterbalance the 
In explanation, based on Experiment 1 we argue that checkers’ 
attention is generally biased toward the threatening aspects of the 
appliances. In Experiment 2 this is moderated by the emphasis on 
spatial locations of probe-2, but may still provide high checkers with 
a slight advantage in accessing the state of an appliance at a resolv-
able compared to a misleading location during probe-1. This may 
explain why the group difference for resolvable trials did not reach 
significance while it did for misleading trials. We argue that our expla-
nation in terms of attention biased by the threatening aspects of the 
stimuli may be particularly true when locations are being challenged 
during probe 2 (cf. Experiment 2) rather than if stimuli identities 
are challenged. This proposal is based on the results of Harkin and 
Kessler (2009, 2011) that showed that high checkers exhibited mem-
ory impairments when questioned about the location of a certain 
stimulus, but not when questioned about the identity of a stimulus 
at a certain location. That is, maintaining the correct location of an 
appliance in WM depends more strongly on sustained attention than 
maintaining the identity of the appliance. Indeed, identity representa-
tions may be harder to disrupt than location representations because 
the identity of a stimulus is based on concepts stored in long-term 
memory (LTM), whereas the location of a stimulus is arbitrary and 
specific to the experimental context. In contrast to our previous stud-
ies, however, we employed an equal ratio of misleading, resolvable, 
and no-probe-1 trials throughout our two experiments (in contrast 
to counterbalanced ratios across two blocks in Harkin and Kessler, 
2009, 2011) which further underpins the robustness of our findings 
with ecologically valid scenarios.
Finally, we suggest that high checkers’ intact no-probe-1 per-
formance in Experiment 2, in contrast to generally impaired per-
formance in Experiment 1, is due to task differences regarding the 
memory probe (probe 2). Specifically, Experiment 1 required the 
accurate recall of the appliances’ “ON/OFF” status while Experiment 
2 probed the correct location of an appliance. As this no-probe-1 
impairment was neither previously reported (Harkin and Kessler, 
2009, 2011) nor was it observed in Experiment 2, the locus of the 
difference must be specific to the probe-2 task in Experiment 1 
where attention was again focused on the threatening aspects of 
the stimuli (electric on/off status). We propose that this may have 
in turn affected the encoding, maintenance and/or retrieval of mul-
timodal bindings in Experiment 1 in form of interference fuelled 
by anxiety. In fact we regard the group main effect in Experiment 
1 as confirmation of the ecological validity of our stimuli.
While group differences in confidence were not observed in 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 revealed a group main effect for a 
lack of confidence in high scorers. This highlights that a continu-
ous confidence scale (Experiment 2) is not only more sensitive for 
detecting group effects but it also lends itself to a wider range of sta-
tistical analyses compared to the binary forced-choice (Experiment 
1). The main effect in Experiment 2 indicates that high checkers 
have a global (trial-type independent) impairment in confidence 
compared to low checkers. That is, although correlations where 
high between accuracy and confidence for both groups, only high 
checkers showed a significant discrepancy for the no-probe 1 tri-
als. This dissociation between performance and confidence in the 
baseline condition in particular, suggests a metacognitive deficit 
in form of impaired performance monitoring that is present in 
high- but absent in low checkers.
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